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Abstract Consumer sales promotions are usually the result
of the decisions of two marketing channel parties, the
manufacturer and the retailer. In making these decisions,
each party normally follows its own interest: i.e. maximizes
its own profit. Unfortunately, this results in a suboptimal
outcome for the channel as a whole. Independent profit
maximization by channel parties leads to a lack of channel
coordination with the implication of leaving money on the
table. This may well contribute to the notoriously low
profitability of sales promotions. This paper first shows
analytically why the suboptimality occurs, and then
presents an empirical demonstration, using a unique dataset
from an Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) project; ECR
is a movement in which parties work together to optimize
the distribution channel). In this dataset, actual profit is
only a small fraction of potential profit, implying that there
is a large degree of suboptimality. It is important that (1)
channel parties are aware of this suboptimality; and (2) that
they have tools to deal with it. Solutions to the channel
coordination problem should ensure that the goals of the
individual channel parties are aligned with the goals of the
channel as a whole. The paper proposes one particular
agreement for this purpose, called proportional discount
sharing. Application to the ECR data shows a win-win
result for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Recogni-
tion of the channel coordination problem by the manufac-
turer and the retailer is the necessary starting point for
agreeing on a way of solving it in a win-win fashion.
Keywords Sales promotions . Price discounts . Channel
coordination . Double marginalization . Efficient consumer
response .Win-win agreement
Introduction
Sales promotions are instruments to stimulate the sales of
products and brands, especially in consumer-packaged
goods. Frequently, over 20% of the sales in a product
category occur under sales promotions (Teunter 2002). The
Trade Promotion Report, 2005, indicates that promotion
accounted for roughly 75% of marketing expenditures for
US packaged goods manufacturers between 1997 and 2004;
the other 25% is advertising. In this way, trade promotions
play an important role in the marketing of fast-moving
consumer products.
The volume effects of sales promotions are mostly very
evident, sometimes spectacularly so. Gross lift factors of five
to ten are no exceptions (Blattberg et al. 1995). However,
there are continuing doubts about the profitability of sales
promotions. In a Supermarket News article in 1996, Orgel
mentioned that only 10–20% of grocery promotions are
profitable events. A more recent consultancy report about
sales promotions carries the telling title, “Pouring Money
into a Leaky Bucket” (Jones 2004). Academic researchers
also express concerns, both about the profitability of sales
promotions for the manufacturer (Achenbaum and Mitchel
1987; Ailawadi 2001; Farris and Ailawadi 1992; Nijs et al.
2001) and for the retailer (Urbany et al. 2000; Walzer 1987).
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Recent empirical studies confirm this bleak picture. Sales
promotions account for approximately two-thirds of all
promotional spending, but only 16% are profitable (Drèze
and Bell 2003). Srinivasan et al.’s (2004) analysis of data for
75 brands in 25 categories over 399 weeks indicates that the
overall channel gain from sales promotions is negative.
Ailawadi et al. (2006) examine all the promotions in a whole
year of the leading drug store CVS in the United States and
find that the net profit impact is negative.
Why do channel parties continue to use sales promo-
tions, if they are such “leaky buckets”? From a managerial
perspective, there can be various motivations for sales
promotions, even if they are not directly profitable, e.g. to
increase market share (manufacturer), to boost store traffic
(retailer), and strategic considerations (for example to
maintain a good relationship with a favorite channel
partner). Furthermore, there may be a prisoner dilemma
situation: if everyone uses sales promotions, you have to
follow suit, even if it is clear that it would be better to
refrain from using them.
Whatever the motivation for sales promotions, their
profitability should always be an important concern and this
paper investigates how the profitability of sales promotions
can be improved. We focus on one particular cause of the
low profitability of sales promotions—the lack of channel
coordination. A marketing channel is said to be coordinated
if the decisions of the different actors result in the
maximum profit for the channel (Jeuland and Shugan
1983; Ingene and Parry 2004). In the context of sales
promotions, lack of channel coordination occurs when the
combination of the independent decisions of the manufac-
turer and the retailer do not fully exploit the potential of the
channel. This results in a channel profitability of sales
promotions that is suboptimal. We explain this in more
detail in “Analytical approach to double marginalization in
sales promotions”.
As shown in Fig. 1, two parties in the distribution
channel decide about sales promotions, the manufacturer
and the retailer. Their decisions affect the characteristics of
a sales promotion, such as the type of sales promotion, the
size of the price discount, announcements in flyers, point-
of-sale displays, etc. These, in turn, determine the effect of
the sales promotion in terms of extra sales. However, a
sales promotion usually also involves extra costs (planning,
logistics, sales promotion materials such as flyers and
displays, etc.). The extra sales (and the margins on these
sales) together with the costs determine the profitability of
the sales promotion, for each of the channel parties
separately, and for the channel as a whole.
Since the advent of scanner data there has been a surge
in research on the measurement of sales promotion effects
using econometric techniques. We now have a rich set of
sophisticated models and methods (see Van Heerde and
Neslin 2008 for a recent overview) to estimate the effects of
sales promotions on sales (i.e., the link between the
characteristics of the sales promotion and the extra sales
in Fig. 1). However, these models only tell us what the
extra sales will be, given the characteristics of the sales
promotion. To explain the profitability of sales promotions
(or the lack thereof), we also need to consider what drives
the decisions of the channel parties, leading to the actual
sales promotions that we observe in the market. In
particular, it is important to examine possible forces that
drive sales promotions in a direction that makes them less
profitable than they could have been. Here we refer to the
lack of channel coordination that is the central topic of our
research. “Decisions on sales promotions in the distribution
channel” discusses the nature and function of sales
promotions, how the parties in the distribution channel
determine their characteristics (especially the price dis-
count), and how marketing channel theory can help to
explain suboptimal sales promotions. “Analytical approach
to double marginalization in sales promotions” analytically
shows how the lack of channel coordination systematically
leads to suboptimal sales promotions.
The empirical measurement of losses caused by the lack
of channel coordination in practice is not easy because it
requires information that channel parties normally do not
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Fig. 1 How the decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer determine the profitability of a sales promotion.
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share. Especially information about the costs of sales
promotions is mostly lacking. The present study uses a
unique database from an ECR project, in which parties did
exchange detailed information. In “The ECR study”, we use
this database and empirically demonstrate the existence of a
lack of channel coordination for sales promotions, and
demonstrate how serious its impact can be.
“Removing suboptimality by means of channel coordina-
tion” discusses possible solutions for the channel coordina-
tion problem and proposes a “proportional discount sharing
agreement” (PDS) between the manufacturer and the retailer,
in which each party contributes to the consumer price
discount in proportion to its original margin. “Application
of PDS to the ECR data” uses data from the ECR project to
show the effect of the proportional discount sharing
agreement for the manufacturer and the retailer. The
managerial implications of PDS and recommendations for
further research are discussed in the conclusion.
Decisions on sales promotions in the distribution
channel
Sales promotions are “action-oriented marketing events
whose purpose is to have a direct impact on the behavior of
customers” (Blattberg and Neslin 1990, p 3). The most
important features of sales promotions are: (i) inducement to
enhance sales; (ii) non-routine; and (iii) short duration. The
idea is that a temporary shift in stimuli causes a sudden shift
in behavior (Van Waterschoot and van den Bulte 1992). The
purpose of these temporary incentives is to “act now”
(Rossiter and Bellman 2005, p 347). In the majority of sales
promotions in fast-moving consumer goods, these incentives
include a price discount for the consumer, mostly accompa-
nied by displays on the shop floor, advertisements in leaflets
and door-to-door local newspapers, and sometimes radio
and/or TV commercials. This implies that a sales promotion
usually involves several marketing mix elements: price,
communication, product (e.g., special promotional packages)
and place. Therefore, sales promotions may pervade all of
the four Ps (Van Waterschoot and van den Bulte 1992).
As shown in Fig. 1, the characteristics of a sales
promotion are the result of decisions made by the
manufacturer and the retailer.
The relative influence of these two channel parties on the
sales promotion and the contribution of each of the partners
to the costs depend on the relative power of the parties
(Kasulis et al. 1999). In the market described in this paper,
large manufacturers deal with large supermarket chains.
This means that in our case both parties are strong,
implying a “strong symmetric situation” in the typology
of Kasulis et al. (1999). These authors state that a strong
symmetric situation leads to agreements such as calendar
marketing schemes, display allowances, and cooperative
advertising. All these elements are present in the setting of
our study. In the European market studied in this paper, the
influence of the retailer on sales promotions is relatively
strong. It is the retailer who initiates the process by
presenting an annual promotions plan. The retailer then
invites manufacturers to propose sales promotions, that
should fit in this plan. These proposals are first quite
general (only the products and the weeks are determined),
but as the time draws closer, they become more specific and
include the discounts given by the manufacturer and the
retailer (Verstappen et al. 1998). This situation may differ
from North America, where the manufacturer mostly seems
to be the initiator of a sales promotion (comment from one
of the reviewers). The agreements on sharing the costs for
displays and cooperative promotion are usually structural.
However, for each individual sale promotion, each party
decides what it is willing to contribute to the consumer
price discount. The sum of these two elements, the
manufacturer discount and the retailer discount, is the
consumer discount. In this paper, we look at how these
discounts come about—at the mechanism behind them—
and examine if and how this mechanism leads to a
suboptimal outcome. Since sales promotions occur within
the environment of the distribution channel, we start our
discussion with distribution channel literature.
Distribution channel literature
Over the last 40 years, our understanding of distribution
channels has greatly improved (Coughlan et al. 2006).
Channel communication, power of channel members, the
monitoring of channel members, channel control, channel
conflict, and contracting between channel partners are
examples of topics that have been studied in channel
literature (Frazier 1999). Although sales promotions are
related to most of these topics in some sense, this subject
has not received much specific attention in marketing
channel literature. An important sub-stream of this literature
focuses on channel coordination, using a game-theory
approach. Authors using this approach include Jeuland
and Shugan (1983); McGuire and Staelin (1983); Choi
(1991); and Ingene and Parry (2004, 2007). However,
publications in this sub-stream do not appear to address
sales promotions to any great degree. The element of price
(i.e., price agreements between parties in the distribution
channel) plays an important role in this work, but from our
earlier discussion of sales promotions, it is clear that a sales
promotion with a temporary price discount is different from
a structural decrease in the consumer price. In the case of a
sales promotion, consumers know that it is a temporary
opportunity, and marketing communication activities such
as displays, features and advertisements support the sales
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promotion. Therefore, the sales response elasticity is likely
to be different for a sales promotion, as compared to a
change in the regular price. This is also empirically
confirmed in, for example, Guadagni and Little (1983)
and Inman et al. (1990).
Sales promotions literature
As we already mentioned, sales promotions literature focuses
on the measurement of the effects of sales promotions
(Blattberg and Neslin 1990; Neslin 2002; Van Heerde and
Neslin 2008). When sales promotions literature addresses the
decisions of the actors, the typical approach is from the
perspective of one of the actors. For example, researchers
study how retailers react (or should react) to trade deals
offered by manufacturers (Murry and Heide 1998; Tyagi
1999; Walters 1989). Also recent work on pass-through, see
for example Besanko et al. (2005); Moorthy (2005), and
Pauwels (2007), examines how retailers make decisions (or
should make decisions), given the decision of the manufac-
turer. This is a one-sided approach, lacking the perspective of
channel optimization. In the context of forward buying, these
authors show how manufacturers and retailers can make
specific agreements that benefit both parties. Forward buying
means that the retailer purchases more from the manufacturer
at the sales promotion price than it will sell during the sales
promotion. The retailer sells the rest later at the regular price.
However, such agreements do not coordinate the channel for
sales promotions. This is discussed in more detail in the next
section.
We conclude that thus far, published sales promotions
literature has overlooked the problem of lack of channel
coordination (see also Ailawadi et al. 1999).
Link between channels literature and sales promotions
literature
From the previous discussion, it is clear that the link
between channels literature and sales promotions literature
remains incomplete. In the former there is the important
notion of channel coordination. The most important notion
of channel coordination is the following; parties in the
distribution channel make their decisions from the perspec-
tive of the benefits for their own organization. However, if
a particular actor somewhere in the marketing channel
makes a decision, this has implications for the sales and
profits of other channel members. For example, if a retailer
gives a price discount to its consumers, this will result in
the selling of a larger volume. This does not only affect the
retailer, but also the manufacturer who will sell more (to the
retailer), and make more profit (assuming a positive profit).
Therefore, the actions of one particular channel member
affect the outcome for the channel beyond the outcomes for
the actor itself. If parties act in their own (myopic) interest
and do not recognize the extra effects for the channel, sub-
optimization of the channel as a whole will occur.
Jeuland and Shugan (1983) show that the lack of channel
coordination is fundamental, and in principle applies to all
marketing variables, price, as well as non-price variables
(e.g. advertising and shelf-space decision). In this paper, we
take the general notion of channel coordination and apply
this to the specific topic of the sales promotion decisions of
manufacturers and retailers. A lack of channel coordination
results in lower channel profits, and therefore contributes to
the low profitability of sales promotions observed in
practice. The problem is solvable through a channel
coordination mechanism (Jeuland and Shugan 1983) guar-
anteeing that individual channel members, when pursuing
their own interest, also act in the interest of the channel as a
whole. Channel coordination in its generic form has
received considerable attention in economics and market-
ing, under the name of the “double marginalization
problem” (Gerstner and Hess 1995; Jeuland and Shugan
1983; Spengler 1950). The term “double marginalization”
derives from the fact that each channel member increases its
efforts (i.e., increases its discount) up to the point that its
own marginal revenue is equal to its own marginal costs.
As we will see in the next section, if both channel members
do this (“double marginalization”), the result is a subopti-
mal outcome at the channel level.
Relevance of the insights
This paper extends the general channel coordination theory
to sales promotions. We will show that sales promotion
agreements that coordinate the channel lead to higher
profits. Although the extension is interesting, this will not
come as a surprise to readers familiar with the theory of
channel coordination since a coordinated channel always
performs better than an uncoordinated channel. However,
the degree of the improvement, as observed in the empirical
study, is quite impressive. For readers of sales promotions
literature, this paper explains how the double margin-
alization phenomenon contributes to the low profitability of
sales promotions. For both groups, and for practitioners in
the market place, the possibility of restoring channel
coordination by means of a proportional discount sharing
agreement is equally important.
Analytical approach to double marginalization in sales
promotions
In this section, we apply the general channel coordination
theory (Jeuland and Shugan 1983; Ingene and Parry 2004)
to sales promotions. We derive expressions for the actual
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and optimal sales promotions as functions of the discounts
given during the sales promotions. This section shows that
if both the manufacturer and the retailer maximize their
own profit, the sales promotions are suboptimal at the
channel level. The intuitive reasoning for this is as follows:
a channel member spending money to make a sales
promotion more attractive for consumers (for example by
giving a larger discount) not only increases its sales, but
also the sales of the channel partner. For example, a larger
discount given by the retailer also allows the manufacturer
to sell more (and make more profit). However, when
making the trade-off between costs and increased revenue,
a channel member compares the costs of the sales
promotion only with an increase in its own profit.
Consequently, the channel member has no incentive to
enhance the sales promotion beyond the point where the
additional (own) costs become equal to the additional (own)
revenue, i.e. where marginal revenue becomes equal to
marginal costs. This neglects the additional revenue that the
sales promotion generates elsewhere in the channel. From a
channel point of view, an individual channel member stops
enhancing a sales promotion too early in the process.
Consider the following demonstration. Whether or not a
price discount is profitable at the channel level depends on
the extra sales (volume) generated and the margin sacrificed
on the regular sales (see also Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999).
If and how each of the two parties, the retailer and the
manufacturer, benefit from the sales promotion depends on
the sharing of the burden of the consumer price discount,
that is, how much each party contributes to this discount.
The allocation of other costs in the sales promotion
(displays in stores, advertisements in local newspapers
and retailers’ door-to-door leaflets) also affects the profit-
ability of the sales promotion for each party.
Table 1 gives the definition of the variables in this paper.
Let dm be the contribution to the consumer price
discount by the manufacturer, and dr the contribution of
the retailer. The consumer price discount, dc, is the sum of
each party’s contributions to the discount, that is,
dc ¼ dr þ dm:
Now, if the manufacturer sets his discount, dm, in such a
way that its own profit is at its maximum, it can be shown
(Appendix 1, Eq. A1.7) that its optimal discount is:
dm* ¼ s c drð Þ=2þ B= 2gð Þ ð1Þ
In the notation * refers to the optimal value if the channel
party maximizes the own profit and ** refers to the optimal
value if the channel party maximizes the channel profit.
Furthermore, s is the (regular) selling price of the
manufacturer to the retailer, c is the manufacturing costs
per unit, B is the baseline sales, and g is the coefficient of dc
in the discount response function. Equation 1 is the
expression for a linear discount response function, but the
results are true for any function where sales increase as
discount becomes larger. (The results related to the effects
of double marginalization hold for any upward-sloping
discount response function which is equivalent to a
downward-sloping demand function-, see Jeuland and
Shugan (1983, p 242)).
By considering only its own profit, the manufacturer
does not take into account that increasing its discount dm,
not only affects its own results, but also those of the retailer.
After all, a larger dm implies a larger dc, and therefore,
Table 1 Definitions of the variables used in the paper
dm = price discount given by the manufacturer
dr = price discount given by the retailer
dc = total price discount for the consumer (dc=dm+dr)
p = regular consumer price
pd = consumer discount price (pd=p – dc)
q(pd) = volume of the product sold (in units) as a function of the (discounted) consumer price
s = selling price of the manufacturer to the retailer (regular, i.e., in the absence of sales promotions)
c = manufacturing costs per unit (production costs)
B = baseline sales, i.e., the sales volume of the product in the absence of the sales promotion
Fr = fixed costs of the retailer
Fm = fixed costs of the manufacturer
FSr = fixed costs of the sales promotion for the retailer (planning and execution costs)
FSm = fixed costs of the sales promotion for the manufacturer (planning and execution costs)
Πr = profit from the sales promotion for the retailer
Πm = profit from the sales promotion for the manufacturer
Πc = profit from the sales promotion for the channel (Πc = Πr + Πm)
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higher (volume) sales of the retailer. This means that the
retailer’s profit is also larger (as long as the retailer’s
margin is positive). The manufacturer would take the
additional profit of the retailer into account if it owned
the retailer. In that case, it would set its discount (see
Appendix 1, Eq. A1.8) at:
dm** ¼ s c drð Þ=2þ B= 2gð Þ þ p s drð Þ=2 ð2Þ
A comparison of Eq. (2) with Eq. (1) shows that the
manufacturer’s discount is larger if it maximizes overall
channel profit (assuming that the retailer’s margin [p - s -
dr] is positive).
Therefore, a manufacturer maximizing its own profit sets
the discount lower than when maximizing the profit of the
channel.
For the retailer, a similar mechanism is at work. If the
retailer maximizes its own profit, it sets its discount at
(Appendix 1, Eq. A1.10):
dr* ¼ p s dmð Þ=2þ B= 2gð Þ ð3Þ
However, if the retailer takes the profit effect for the
manufacturer into account (which it would do if it owned
the manufacturer) the optimal discount is (Appendix 1,
Eq. A1.11):
dr**¼ p s dmð Þ=2þ B= 2gð Þþ s c dmð Þ=2 ð4Þ
The discount is lower as long as the manufacturer makes a
positive margin [s - c - dm].
Therefore, each channel party, the manufacturer and the
retailer, sets its discount in a way that the own marginal
profit (δΠm/δdm and δΠr/δdr, respectively) equals zero
(double marginalization).
Abstracting from the individual channel parties (manu-
facturer and retailer) we can also derive the optimal channel
discount directly (see Appendix 1, Eq. A1.14):
dc** ¼ p cð Þ=2þ B= 2gð Þ ð5Þ
Going back to the situation of the manufacturer owning the
retailer, the total consumer discount would be: dm**+dr,
and using Eq. (1) this is:
dm**þ dr ¼ p cð Þ=2þ B= 2gð ð6Þ
It is clear from Eq. (5) that this is equal to dc**, i.e. the
channel-optimal discount.
In the same way, if the retailer owned the manufacturer:
dr**þ dm ¼ p cð Þ=2þ B= 2gð Þ ¼ dc**: ð7Þ
It is apparent that if a channel member sets its discount
to maximize the profit of both parties, it automatically
maximizes the channel profit. However, channel members
typically only maximize their own profit, which leads to
discounts that are too low and therefore suboptimal from
the channel point-of-view. The implication of this myopic
approach is that the joint profits are lower than would have
been possible.
Comments to this modeling approach
We add two comments. First, we use a single-period bilateral
monopoly model and look at the coordination problem within
the “channel dyad” of one manufacturer and one retailer
(Ingene and Parry 2004, 2007). In principle, we have a
vertical Nash game here. If such a game were “played out”
completely, this would lead to equilibrium values for the
manufacturer discount and the retailer discount, known as
the Nash equilibrium. We give the expressions for the Nash
equilibrium values in Appendix 1 (Eqs. A1.17, A1.18). We
will check empirically in our database to what extent a Nash
equilibrium occurs.
Second, we look at dyadic-coordination between one
manufacturer and one retailer and we abstract from other
retailers and manufacturers. This is reasonable in the
empirical setting of the Netherlands, where each sales
promotion is unique, with conditions separately negotiated
between the manufacturer and the retailer within the dyad.
Retailers work with “promotion calendars” and generally
there is no other sales promotion in the same product (sub)
category in the same week. Furthermore, the same product
of a manufacturer is usually not in a sales promotion at
another retailer in the same week. Nevertheless, even if the
presence of other parties would be a reason for a less than
channel-optimal sales promotion within a particular dyad, it
is still important to know how much is lost by departing
from the sales promotion that would have been the best for
the particular dyad. In that case, the analysis at the level of
the dyad remains important.
After this formal analytical approach, we now turn to the
ECR study to see how this works in practice.
The ECR study
The data used comprise 86 sales promotions in a food product
category, collected in the context of an ECR project. As
mentioned earlier, Efficient Consumer Response is a move-
ment in which manufacturers and retailers work together in
order to optimize the distribution channel (FMI 1993;
Coughlan et al. 2006). “Efficient sales promotions” is one
of the four major ECR domains for improving the
cooperation between manufacturers and retailers (FMI 1993)
The dataset for each sales promotion contains the actual
price discount, the sales volume generated at this discount,
and the contributions of each channel partner to the
discount. Furthermore, in the ECR project there is
information about manufacturing costs, handling and
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execution costs of sales promotions, the costs of features
and display materials, and about the payments made by the
manufacturer to the retailer to compensate for sales
promotions costs. With this detailed information, we can
compute actual profitability, including the division of profit
between manufacturer and retailer. Therefore, we can
determine the amount of suboptimality: the extent to which
the channel parties have acted in a suboptimal way and
have left money on the table.
The data
The 86 sales promotions in the dataset cover a period of
23 weeks and are from a retailing chain in the Netherlands.
The (overall) product category is fresh dessert products
with six subcategories: yogurt, sweet desserts, drinks,
functional foods, curd, and culinary. The actual sales
promotions take place within one of these subcategories.
The database includes all sales promotions in the retail
chain in the six subcategories of the fresh desserts category
during the period studied. All promotions are price
discounts, supported by feature advertisements in door-to-
door circulars distributed around the stores. The sales data
are scanner data collected by the retailer.
The running time of these sales promotions is 1 week. All
relevant information is available: regular consumer price,
price discount given to the consumer, regular purchasing price
for the retailer, and purchasing price for the retailer during
discount. In the ECR project for the product category that we
study, the production costs of the manufacturer on average
account for 70% of the regular purchasing price of the retailer
(“selling price” in Table 1). We use this figure for the sales
promotions in our data set. (Often companies do not know
exact production costs figures and then work with similar
assumptions). However, we have exact figures for the
specific products for 25 of the 86 sales promotions involved
in our study and we also carry out a separate computation of
the profit increase from the actual to the channel-optimal
consumer discount for these 25.
We also take into account the processing costs of the
sales promotions. For an individual sales promotion these
are “fixed costs”, independent of the sales volume
generated by the sales promotion. We use the results from
an Activity Based Costing project (Verstappen et al. 1998)
for the processing costs (at the manufacturer and the
retailer). These authors first defined all activities carried
out for a sales promotion at the retailer and the manufac-
turer and then measured the resources spent on these
activities (e.g., time, budget, space) during a particular
period. Examples of such activities are planning, writing a
proposal, logistic activities of storing and transportation,
production of leaflets, filling displays, costs of space, etc.
The fixed costs per sales promotion is calculated by
dividing the number of sales promotions during the same
period. Cost figures for the out-of-pocket cost of advertise-
ments and leaflets are directly available. It turns out that the
retailer incurs the bulk (96%) of the actual costs of the sales
promotions. However, since the manufacturer pays the
retailer an amount for each sales promotion, in the end the
manufacturer on average pays 72% of the fixed costs.
For the sales promotions in the database, the regular
consumer price of the items ranges from NLG 0.69 cents to
NLG 4.99. The average discount is NLG 0.37 cents or 18%
of the average regular consumer price of NLG 2.08. In this
paper, we work with the monetary unit (Netherlands
guilders-NLG) that was applicable at the time to which
the data refer (1 NLG is about 0.45 Euro or 0.60 US$).
Data shows that the retailer has paid (on average) 70% of
the price discount for the promotions in the database. This
large share in the consumer discount means that the retailer
does not simply pass on the manufacturer’s discount to the
consumer but “amplifies” it. The mean “pass-through”
equals (Bucklin 1987) 1/(1 – 0.70)* 100=333. In the
literature, the figures for pass-through vary widely. One
earlier study, Chevalier and Curhan (1976), found pass-
through rates ranging from 0 to 211%. Armstrong (1991)
reported pass-through rates for four product categories in
FMCG ranging from 143% to 285%. In a study of Besanko
et al. (2005), the range was from 22% to 558%, whereas the
recent study by Pauwels (2007) found pass-through rates
from 0% to 183%. Therefore, the pass-through rate in our
study is relatively high, but still comparable to those found
in other studies.
Actual profitability of the sales promotions
The analysis computes the profitability of a sales promotion
as the extra profit for the specific item due to the sales
promotion, that is, the net increase in margin minus the
costs of the sales promotion. The extra sales are actual sales
minus baseline sales. “Baseline sales” are the sales that
would have occurred at the regular price. We compute
baseline sales by taking the average weekly sales over a
period of 10 weeks: 5 weeks before and 5 weeks after the
particular week, leaving out the highest and the lowest
value, weeks with promotions in the category, and weeks
with special days (e.g. the Christmas week). Tables 2 and 3
shows the profitability figures calculated in this way.
Table 2 shows that over all 86 sales promotions, the
average profit per sales promotion is negative for the
manufacturer (−59), positive for the retailer (+62), and
marginally positive (+3) for the channel as a whole. About
one-third (35%) of all sales promotions are profitable for
the manufacturer whereas this stands at two-thirds (67%)
for the retailer. At the channel level, 47 sales promotions
(55%) are profitable, implying that the channel profit is
J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci. (2010) 38:383–397 389
negative for almost half of the sales promotions. Only a
small number, 16 out of 86, or 19% of the sales promotions
are profitable for both retailer and manufacturer (Table 3).
Next, we can compare these outcomes with figures in
literature. The finding that 19% of the sales promotions are
profitable for both manufacturers and retailers is close to the
figure of 16%, mentioned by Drèze and Bell (2003).
Interestingly, in our study the manufacturer fares worse than
the retailer, whereas Srinivasan et al. (2004) conclude the
opposite. The fact that the present study takes into account
the amount the manufacturer pays to the retailer as
contributions for the flyers and other promotional activities
(these numbers were available in the ECR dataset, but not in
the Srinivasan et al. study) explains this difference. Other-
wise, our study would also have concluded that the majority
of the sales promotions are profitable for the manufacturer
and not for the retailer. Altogether, the results confirm the
bleak view regarding the profitability of sales promotions.
The computation here is for the direct effect of a sales
promotion. The study could include indirect effects, for
example cross-brand effects, accounting for the fact that a
part of the extra sales may come at the cost of lower sales
of other brands in the same category. This inclusion would
only further deteriorate the profitability of the sales
promotions. Including cross-period substitution (e.g., taking
into account that the sales may be lower in the weeks after
the sales because of stockpiling) would have the same
effect. However, such effects are small for fresh products
with a limited shelf life as we have here.
Potential profitability and evidence of double
marginalization
Are there indications that the low profitability of these sales
promotions is due to suboptimality caused by double margin-
alization? To answer this question, we compute the optimal
sales promotions for the 86 cases. This requires a model for
the relationship between the consumer discount price and
sales, i.e. the discount response function. We test a linear
model versus a power function. To determine the shape of the
discount response function, we pool data from the various
sales promotions. In order to make the cases commeasurable,
we set the baseline sales at 100 for each case and then express
the actual sales in the terms of the corresponding index
number. We do the same for the price (regular price=100). In
this way, we obtain data points for 86 sales promotions, with a
number for the discount price and a number for sales for each
sales promotion. Regression analyses, one for the linear model
and one for the power model, result in a slightly better fit with
the linear model (R2 is 0.28 for the linear model and 0.27 for
the power model). This finding is in agreement with other
authors, for example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) who find
linear retail demand curves (at least locally). The remainder
of the analyses uses a linear relationship between consumer
discount price and sales.
Next, we estimate a linear model for the relationship
between price discount and sales for each individual sales
promotion. The inputs are the baseline sales (at the regular
price) and the actual sales (at the consumer discount price).
With this information it is possible to estimate the parameter g
of the discount response function (see Eq. A1.1) for each
sales promotion. Subsequently, the study computes the
optimal channel discount, dc**, (using Eq. 5), and the
corresponding sales and profit. A comparison is then possible
between the channel profit corresponding with the optimal
consumer price discount and the actual channel profit.
Table 4 shows that the suboptimality of the channel is
very serious indeed. Over all 86 cases, total channel profit
for the actual sales promotion is only a tiny fraction (less
than one percent) of the potential channel profit that is with
all price discounts set at the optimal level (266 versus
31,914 guilders). The average actual profit per sales
promotions is only three guilders (266/86), which is
negligible. However, with channel-optimal discounts, the
average profit per sales promotion increases by 368 to 371
guilders (31,914/86).
Table 3 Numbers of profitable/nonprofitable sales promotions for the manufacturer and the retailer respectively
Profitable for manufacturer (M+) Not profitable for manufacturer (M−) n
Profitable for Retailer (R+) 16 42 58 (67%)
Not Profitable for Retailer (R−) 14 14 28 (33%)
30 (35%) 56 (65%) 86
Average profit per sales promotion Number of profitable sales promotions
Manufacturer −59 30 (35%)
Retailer 62 58 (67%)
Channel 3 47 (55%)
Table 2 Profitability of the
sales promotions in the data-
base for the retailer and the
manufacturer (n=86). (Profits
are in NLG-Dutch guilders)
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Sensitivity to production cost figures The results in Table 4
are based on a production cost figure of 70% of the regular
selling price of the manufacturer to the retailer. As
mentioned earlier, we have the actual production cost
figures for 25 of the 86 sales promotions in our database.
We analyzed these 25 separately and found that when we
go from the actual to the channel-optimal sales promotion
the improvement in profitability is on average 312 guilders
per sales promotion. Although this is slightly lower, it is of
the same order of magnitude as the increase (368) in
Table 4 for all the sales promotions under the 70%
production cost assumption. This robustness check con-
firms our conclusion that the discounts for the sales
promotions in the database are not optimal.
What is behind this suboptimality? From Table 4 we
conclude that, on average, the consumer discount, dc, is too
small (37 cents, compared to an optimal discount of 45
cents). This is in agreement with the conclusion in the
analytical section of this paper that double marginalization
leads to price discounts that are not deep enough.
To assess whether a discount is too low or too high, it is
useful to consider the derivative of the profitability of the
sales promotion with respect to the size of the discount.
Therefore, this study computes that derivative for each sales
promotion. This occurs for the channel discount, the
manufacturer discount, and the retailer discount, respec-
tively. The values of these derivatives refer to the situation
of the actual discount (for the formulae, see Appendix 1).
Table 5 provides the outcomes. For example, the table
shows that in 63 of 86 sales promotions, the derivative of
channel profitability with respect to channel discount
(= consumer discount) is positive. A positive number
implies that channel profitability increases as consumer
discount becomes larger. In other words, from a channel
perspective, the majority (63 out of 86, i.e. 73%) of the
actual consumer discounts are too small.
However, from the perspective of the manufacturer and the
retailer the discounts are too large. In 97% of the cases (83 out
of 86), the manufacturer would increase its profit by lowering
its discount. For the retailer this is the case in 72% (62 out of
86) of the cases. Therefore, we have a clear-cut situation of
double marginalization here: individual channel parties have
an incentive to decrease their discounts whereas for a channel
as a whole the discount should be larger.
Nash equilibrium As mentioned earlier, if the conditions
for each sales promotion were the result of an ongoing
dynamic adjustment process between the actors, theoreti-
cally, a Nash equilibrium would be the result. However, we
do not expect this to occur very often in our dataset,
because each sales promotion is unique and its conditions
are typically determined in a “one-shot” interaction be-
tween the manufacturer and the retailer. When verifying
this, we found that the actual discounts in our data are in
agreement with the Nash equilibrium in 6% of the sales
promotions. (Since exact equality is not likely, we
concluded that a discount value is at the Nash equilibrium
value if it is less than 5 cents removed from that value). The
Nash equilibrium is typically a rest point from some
dynamic adjustment process of a game that is played
repeatedly (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, p 249). Since each sales
promotion is a unique event that is played only once (not
“the rest point of a dynamic adjustment process”, Ibid p
249), it is not surprising that a Nash equilibrium does not
occur very often in our data.
Removing suboptimality by means of channel
coordination
Existing approaches
We first briefly discuss three approaches from literature that
might be used for removing suboptimality in sales
promotions.
Table 4 Actual channel performance versus optimal channel perfor-
mance (Numbers are in Dutch guilders)
Actual Optimal
dc (mean) 0.37 0.45
Channel profitability of sales promotions 266 31,914
Profitability per sales promotion 3 371
Table 5 Conclusions about the discount from the channel, the manufacturer, and the retailer’s point-of-view at the actual discount levels
>0 <0 # Conclusion
Channel δΠc/δdc 63
a 23 86 Discount is too small
Manufacturer δΠm/δdm 3 83 86 Discount is too large
Retailer δΠr/δdr 24 62 86 Discount is too large
a ) This means that for 63 sales promotions the derivative of the channel profitability of the sales promotion with respect to the channel discount is
positive.
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Two-step approach
This approach consists of the following steps: (1) ensure that
the consumer discount is set so that it maximizes channel
profit; (2) make an agreement about the division of the profit
generated by this channel-optimal sales promotion. The terms
of this agreement depend on the relative power of the parties.
One option is that the manufacturer receives all the benefits
from moving to the channel optimum. At the other extreme,
all these additional benefits go to the retailer. A solution
receiving considerable attention from game theorists (Harsa-
nyi 1956; Nash 1950; Zeuthen 1930) is that negotiations lead
to an equal division of the additional profits; i.e., a 50/50
split of the benefits. The approach of first maximizing
channel profit and then distributing benefits is conceptually
simple, but its implementation requires a large degree of
mutual trust. One option is to use a model, determine the
optimal discount, compute the additional channel profit ex
ante, and distribute this additional profit between the channel
parties, before running the sales promotion. Another option
is to measure the actual additional sales generated by the
sales promotion afterwards and use this as a basis for the
distribution of profits. Besides mutual trust, both options also
require the separate transfer of money between parties, which
is another disadvantage.
Pricing schedules
Ailawadi et al. (1999) propose to solve this problem of
double marginalization by having the manufacturer design
pricing schedules. A pricing schedule is a set of combina-
tions of manufacturer selling prices and retail selling prices,
designed so that the retailer finds it optimal to price at a
level that maximizes total channel profit. This “leads” the
retailer to the channel-optimal selling price. To make this
operational, both the manufacturer and the retailer have to
know the demand function. Otherwise, the manufacturer
cannot devise a price schedule that will lead the retailer to
the channel optimum, and the retailer cannot decide about
its optimum. Second, a pricing schedule as proposed by
Ailawadi et al. is not unique. Each schedule implies a
certain allocation of the profit over manufacturer and
retailer, and why would a retailer go along with a particular
schedule? The manufacturer can only enforce this if it is
very powerful in comparison to the retailer.
Scan-back agreements
This proposition is from Drèze and Bell (2003), whose study
focuses on scan-back trade deals as instruments to address
the problem of forward buying by retailers. When using
scan-backs, the quantities that a retailer actually sells during
a sales promotion are measured (using scanner data). Drèze
and Bell show that a manufacturer can devise a “redesigned
scan-back” agreement that makes the retailer slightly better
off and the manufacturer strictly better off. The authors call
this “win-win trade promotions”. Such redesigned scan-
backs typically involve deeper discounts and higher retail
sales. Drèze and Bell’s approach is in the same spirit of what
we propose, but their redesigned scan-back agreement only
deals with the forward buying problem. It does not eliminate
the problem of double marginalization in sales promotions
(Drèze and Bell 2003, p 35).
The proposed agreement: proportional discount sharing
(PDS)
The new agreement proposed in this paper is proportional
discount sharing (PDS) where the two channel partners
contribute to the price discount in proportion to their
original margins. If such an agreement is in force, a price
discount decision by an individual channel party automat-
ically leads to the channel optimum.
The original margin of the retailer is regular consumer
price minus selling price of the manufacturer: (p-s) and the
original margin of the manufacturer is selling price of the
manufacturer minus production costs: (s-c). Therefore, a
PDS agreement implies the following:
dr=dm ¼ p cð Þ= s cð Þ ð8Þ
Therefore, we have to prove that if the ratio of the discounts
is in agreement with Eq. (8), channel coordination occurs.
If we define the parameter τ, so that
dr=dm ¼ t  1ð Þ ð9Þ
(It is analytically easier to define this ratio as (τ - 1) instead
of τ, but this is arbitrary)
Combining Eq. (9) with Eq. (A1.4)), results in:
Πm ¼ g tdm s c dmð Þ  Bdm  FSm ð10Þ
Setting δΠm/δdm=0 and solving for dm, gives:
dm* ¼ B= 2 g tð Þ þ s cð Þ=2 ð11Þ
Using Eq. (9), gives:
dr ¼ t  1ð Þ B= 2 g tð Þ þ s cð Þ=2½  ð12Þ
Therefore:
dm*þ drð Þ ¼ B= 2 gð Þ þ t s cð Þ=2 ð13Þ
The left-hand side of Eq. (13) denotes the total channel
discount if the manufacturer maximizes its profit, and the
retailer’s discount is linearly related to the manufacturer’s
discount according to Eq. (9). The question then is for what
value of τ does this coincide with the overall channel
optimum?
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If the PDS condition applies dr=dm ¼ p sð Þ= s cð Þ½ ,
t ¼ p cð Þ= s cð Þ. If we substitute this in Eq. (13), we get
dm*þ drð Þ ¼ B= 2gð Þ þ p cð Þ=2: ð14Þ
The right-hand side of Eq. (14) is identical to the
expression for the optimal consumer discount as given by
Eq. (7). Therefore, this shows that if PDS applies, the
discount that maximizes the manufacturer’s profit also
maximizes the profit of the channel. This analysis takes
the perspective of the manufacturer, but taking the retailer’s
perspective produces the same result.
This analysis proves the proportional discount sharing
(PDS) rule—allocating their contributions to the consumer
price discount in proportion to their original margins—
aligns the profit maximization of the manufacturer, the
retailer and the channel. Therefore, PDS coordinates the
channel.
Jeuland and Shugan (1983, p 252) propose a general
form for a mechanism for channel coordination, whereby
the manufacturer receives fraction k1 of channel profits plus
a fixed amount k2, while the retailer receives fraction (1 -
k1) minus the fixed amount k2. They implement their
general principle for channel coordination, formulated
above, as a quantity-discount-pricing schedule. However,
it is straightforward to interpret PDS as an implementation
of the general Jeuland and Shugan mechanism to sales
promotions, with k1=(s - c)/(p - c) and k2 =0. (In fact, k2 is
not relevant here because it plays no role in the location of
the optimum). This is another proof that PDS leads to
channel coordination. In the empirical application, we show
how this works for actual sales promotions.
In comparison to the other approaches, the implementation
of PDS is very straightforward. It means simply allocating the
consumer price discount between the channel partners in
proportion to their margins before the discount. Of course, this
information has to be available. If exact information is not
available, for example about margins, the best possible
estimates should be used. As regards to the size of the
consumer discount, each of the two parties can make this
decision separately or they decide jointly. Whoever has the
most accurate market information is in the best position to do
this. PDS does not require separate money transfer between
parties, either model-based or scan-back-based. There is also
an element of fairness in that the party with the largest
margin also contributes most to the consumer discount.
Application of PDS to the ECR data
This study applies PDS to the 86 sales promotions of the
ECR study. Compared to the actual sales promotion, the
channel parties are never worse off with PDS and, in many
cases, they are better off. Table 6 gives the improvements
when PDS is used, compared to the actual sales promotions
for the manufacturer and the retailer respectively.
Both parties benefit substantially from PDS. The
situation is clearly win-win. The average improvement per
sales promotion is somewhat larger for the manufacturer
(224) than for the retailer (144). However, the amount per
sales promotion shows considerable variation, and the
difference between these two averages is not significant.
This suggests that the PDS mechanism is not biased in that
it does not systematically favor one of the two parties. This
is also an attractive feature of PDS. These results
demonstrate that PDS creates substantial profit improve-
ments for both the manufacturer and the retailer by
achieving channel coordination.
Conclusions, managerial implications, and further
research
Contribution
The main contribution of this paper is to show the
causes of suboptimal sales promotions and to propose
an agreement, which produces a win-win situation for
the manufacturer and the retailer. If manufacturers and
retailers make their decisions regarding sales promotions
from only the perspective of maximizing their own
profit, then suboptimal sales promotions will be the
result. In the paper, we have explained why this is the
case with a theoretical model and we have demonstrated
how this works out in practice with an empirical study.
The implication is that sales promotions are less
profitable than they could be. Therefore, this contributes
to the low profitability of sales promotions observed in
practice. We have also proposed an instrument to
prevent this from happening: the proportional discount
sharing agreement, which will coordinate the channel.
Managerial implications
There are clear benefits from agreements that bring about
channel coordination for sales promotions, but perhaps
sacrifices as well. Channel coordination may involve
Table 6 Effect of channel coordination through proportional discount
sharing (PDS) (Numbers are in Dutch guilders)
Average profit per sales promotion
Actual PDS Improvement
Manufacturer −59 165 224
Retailer 62 206 144
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sharing information (e.g., about margins) with the other
channel party, which they would not have shared otherwise,
or giving up degrees of freedom (e.g., the possibility of
adapting a consumer price discount at the last moment).
Channel parties will only cooperate if they understand why
this is in their own interest and how they can benefit
(especially in the long run). This requires a considerable
level of trust, as we will discuss below.
Most importantly, parties have to become aware of
the channel coordination problem and its implications
for the profitability of sales promotions. Although sales
promotions are used intensively, many companies spend
little effort on the analysis of the results and are often
not aware of the low profitability. With the recent
developments in IT and scanner data, this situation is
improving. More seriously, it is unlikely that the
representatives of manufacturers and retailers who
negotiate about the conditions for sales promotions are
aware of the double marginalization mechanism. Al-
though it is not a problem if they do not know this
term, they should at least have an intuitive feeling for
the phenomenon and understand that by only looking at
their own interest they may threaten the interest of the
channel, and therefore indirectly jeopardize themselves.
We hope that this paper contributes to the awareness of
this phenomenon.
Any agreement for channel coordination in sales
promotions is maintainable only if parties trust each other.
Furthermore, they should take a long-term perspective. It is
not about who gets what in one particular sales promotion,
but about getting the best joint results from a series of sales
promotions in which the parties work together. Representa-
tives of practice make appeals for developing such joint
promotion strategies (Jones 2004). The ECR (Efficient
Consumer Response) movement also calls for joint strate-
gies for efficient promotions. This paper provides a
theoretical basis for these appeals and shows how much
can be gained. Joint promotion strategies are also in
agreement with the ideas about partnerships between
distributors and manufacturers found in marketing literature
(Anderson and Narus 1990). Within the vertical distribution
channel, it is increasingly recognized that parties should
work together and improve coordination (Achrol and Etzel
2003). Monitoring channel members, through the electronic
transfer of information, is becoming more and more
fashionable. High levels of data interchange (e.g., in ECR
contexts) are transforming the nature of many channel
relationships (Frazier 1999); it also helps to prevent
cheating. Information sharing as a basis for joint decision-
making in sales promotions is becoming more and more
acceptable. The observation that scan-back agreements are
increasingly replacing off-invoice allowances (Cannondale
Associates 2000) illustrates this.
Limitations
The approach proposed in this paper will not completely
solve the problem of the low profitability of sales
promotions, but it can contribute to improving the results.
Double marginalization is not the only cause of the low
profitability of sales promotions. Several reasons exist why
channel partners sometimes accept “leaky” sales promo-
tions. Sometimes the primary goal of a sales promotion is to
increase market share, and not the profit on the sales
promotion itself. The long-term effect of sales promotions
on market share is very limited, however (Srinivasan et al.
2000). A strategic motivation for accepting sales
promotions even if they are not profitable can be the
desire to maintain the relationship with a preferred
channel partner. Alternatively, the purpose of a sales
promotion may be to increase store traffic, where the
profit is made on the sales of other products. Finally,
there is the possibility of the prisoner dilemma, which
occurs if individual channel members want to discon-
tinue loss-making sales promotions, but maintain them
because everyone else does so. However, we do not
have the illusion that recognition of the double margin-
alization phenomenon makes all unprofitable sales
promotions disappear. Nevertheless, knowing about the
advantages of coordinating the channel and using the
instruments discussed in this paper can help manufac-
turers and retailers to limit their losses. If full channel
optimum is not possible in certain situations because of
the type of considerations mentioned above, the theory
and analysis presented in this paper at least make it
possible to compute the costs (missed opportunities)
implied by the suboptimality.
Suggestions for future research
The theory of this paper, in general, holds for all situations
where manufacturers and retailers make decisions regarding
sales promotions. The focus here is on the double margin-
alization mechanism in the context of price discounts.
However, this mechanism plays a role in other marketing
variables too. Whenever a channel party stops increasing its
expenditures to make a sales promotion more attractive at
the point where its marginal cost becomes equal to the own
additional revenue (neglecting additional revenue generated
elsewhere in the channel) sub-optimization occurs. This
state implies that an individual channel party puts fewer
resources in a sales promotion than what is optimal from a
channel point of view. For example, a manufacturer has the
incentive to lower product quality below the channel
maximum level and to lower all other promotional decision
variables at its disposal (Jeuland and Shugan 1983, p 247).
This behavior can occur with any sales promotion instru-
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ment besides price discounts, for example with flyers,
displays, premiums, etc. Extension of the current work to
study the effect of lack of channel coordination on other
sales promotion instruments is very welcome.
Furthermore, the empirical part of the paper is limited to
one dataset. Additional empirical work, with other data,
would be useful to further assess the amount of the loss in
practice due to sales promotions lacking channel coordina-
tion. As we mentioned, it is not easy to obtain relevant data,
and usually the cooperation of both the manufacturer and
the retailer is required. We have examined the problem of
double marginalization here for a particular food category
and in a specific setting of “strong” manufacturers and
retailers. It would be interesting to see if the same
phenomenon occurs in other product categories and settings
as concerns the relative power of the manufacturer and the
retailer.
Other research needed is the development of multi-party
decision support tools, which are useful to facilitate sales
promotion agreements like PDS. Existing decision support
tools for sales promotions are single-party tools that look
from the perspective of one party, for example, the
manufacturers’ sales promotion calendar tool of Silva-
Risso et al. (1999). With a multi-party decision support
tool, one can simulate the effects of alternative discount
options, and show their implications in terms of sales and
profits, both for the retailer and the manufacturer. Multi-
party decision support tools can also help manufacturers
and retailers to understand the mechanism behind double
marginalization.
Simple awareness of double marginalization by channel
parties can help to alleviate the problem. In sales
promotions, channel members are not only each other’s
adversaries (aiming for the largest possible part of the
profit), but they also have to cooperate in order to make the
joint profit as large as possible. We hope that this paper
creates awareness of the potential benefits of cooperation in
sales promotions and is helpful in finding and implement-
ing solutions.
Message to practice
Our message to practice is the following. Use sales
promotions that coordinate the channel if anyhow
possible. We have shown how serious the losses can
be if this is not the case and we propose a method how
to achieve channel-coordinating sales promotions. Even
if you are not able to apply channel-coordinating sales
promotions, for example because of the relationship
with your channel partner, it is still important to know
how much potential profit is foregone at the channel
level. This may help in negotiations with the channel
partner to change the situation.
Appendix 1: Derivation of expressions used in the text
Let q(dc) be the discount response function, i.e. relationship
between the consumer price discount and the volume sold
during a sales promotion (pd=p - dc).
We assume:
q dcð Þ ¼ B gdc ðA1:1Þ
where B=baseline sales (i.e. the sales level if there were no
price discount) and g is parameter (g<0). For a precise
description of the variables, see Appendix 1.
The baseline profit (i.e., without sales promotion) of the
manufacturer is
B s cð Þ  Fm ðA1:2Þ
The manufacturer’s profit with the price discount is:
B gdm  gdrð Þ s c dmð Þ  Fm  FSm ðA1:3Þ
The manufacturer’s profit due to the sales promotion, Πm,
is the difference between expression (A1.3) and expression
(A1.2). After rearranging terms, we have:
Πm ¼ g dm þ drð Þ s c dmð Þ  Bdm  FSm ðA1:4Þ
In the same way, the retailer profit due to the sales
promotion is:
Πr ¼ g dm þ drð Þ p s drð Þ  Bdr  FSr ðA1:5Þ
When the manufacturer maximizes only his own (myopic)
profit, the expression
dΠm=ddm ¼ 2gdm  g s c drð Þ  B ðA1:6Þ
is set equal to zero. This results in:
dm* ¼ s c drð Þ=2þ B= 2gð Þ ðA1:7Þ
However, if the manufacturer chooses dm so that the
channel is optimized, he would also take into account the
effect on the retailer’s profit. He would now maximize
the sum of the expressions (A1.4) and (A1.5). The result
is:
dm** ¼ s c drð Þ=2þ B= 2gð Þ þ p s drð Þ=2 ðA1:8Þ
The situation is symmetric, and we can also take the
perspective of the retailer. When the retailer maximizes
his own profit, the expression:
dΠr=ddr ¼ g p s dm  2drð Þ  B ðA1:9Þ
is set equal to zero, and
dr* ¼ p s dmð Þ=2þ B= 2gð Þ ðA1:10Þ
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If the retailer also took into account the profit effects for
the manufacturer, he would maximize the sum of the
expressions (A1.4) and (A1.5) and arrive at a discount of:
dr** ¼ p s dmð Þ=2þ B= 2gð Þ þ s c dmð Þ=2 ðA1:11Þ
For the channel level we have:
Πc ¼ gdc p c dcð Þ  dcB FSr  FSm ðA1:12Þ
Hence,
dΠc=ddc ¼ g p c 2dcð Þ  B ðA1:13Þ
Setting this expression equal to zero gives:
dc** ¼ p cð Þ=2þ B= 2gð Þ ðA1:14Þ
Nash equilibrium
Given the retailer discount dr, the manufacturer will set his
discount according to Eq. A1.7:
dm* ¼ s c drð Þ=2þ B= 2gð Þ ðA1:15Þ
Next the retailer starting from this dm* sets (following Eq.
A2.10) his discount at
dr* ¼ p s dmð Þ=2þ B= 2gð Þ ðA1:16Þ
etc. etc.
These iterations eventually result in the equilibrium
values:
dm 1ð Þ ¼ 13 * pþ 3s 2cþ
2B
g
 
ðA1:17Þ
dr 1ð Þ ¼ 13 * 2p 3sþ cþ
B
2g
 
ðA1:18Þ
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